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 Abstract 29 
One of the most pressing challenges to the global surveillance of antimicrobial 30 
resistance is the generation, sharing, systematic analysis and dissemination of data in 31 
low-resource settings. Numerous agencies and initiatives are working to support the 32 
development of globally distributed microbiology capacity, but the routine generation 33 
of a sustainable flow of reliable data will take time to establish and deliver clinical and 34 
public health impact. By contrast, there are a large number of pharma and academia-35 
led initiatives that generate a wealth of data on antimicrobial resistance and drug-36 
resistant infections in low-resource settings, together with high volume data generation 37 
by private laboratories. Here, we explore how untapped sources of data could provide 38 
a short-term solution that bridges the gap between now and the time when routine 39 
surveillance capacity has been established, and how this could continue to support 40 
surveillance efforts in the future. We discuss the benefits and limitations of data 41 
generated by these sources, the mechanisms and barriers to making this accessible, and 42 
how academia and pharma might support the development of laboratory and analytical 43 
capacity. We provide key actions that will be required to harness these data, including 44 
a mapping exercise; creating mechanisms for data sharing; use of data to support 45 
National Action Plans; facilitating access to, and use of data by the WHO Global 46 
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System; and innovation in data capture, analysis 47 
and sharing.  48 
 Introduction 49 
Surveillance is central to understanding the global burden of antimicrobial resistance 50 
(AMR). The generation of surveillance data begins with appropriate sampling of 51 
patients with a suspected infectious disease (diagnostic stewardship). Surveillance of 52 
sepsis is one example of this, although other specimen types will be required for more 53 
comprehensive surveillance. Culture and antimicrobial susceptibility testing of 54 
pathogens can improve individual patient management through optimisation of drug 55 
therapy, and supports their appropriate use (antibiotic stewardship). These data are 56 
commonly collated to inform local empiric prescribing policies for patients presenting 57 
with infectious disease syndromes. National data may then be collected by Ministries 58 
of Health for the purposes of surveillance, evidence-based guidelines, programmes of 59 
prevention and resource planning. Finally, national data may be submitted to global 60 
surveillance initiatives that are used to document and track rates of resistance over time, 61 
signal where and when interventions are needed, and identify countries that require 62 
support to build capacity. The most prominent global initiative for the surveillance of 63 
bacterial pathogens (excluding TB) is the WHO Global Antimicrobial Resistance 64 
Surveillance System (GLASS),1 which collects and reports data on resistance rates 65 
aggregated by country.  66 
This description of the generation, flow and analysis of AMR data represents an 67 
ideal situation in which locally generated microbiological results move from a patient 68 
care setting to a national or supranational network, but the reality is that these data are 69 
fragmented and dispersed. A recent review commissioned by the Fleming Fund created 70 
an inventory of supranational antimicrobial resistance surveillance networks in low- 71 
and middle-income countries (LMIC) between January 2000 and August 2017.2,3  This 72 
identified 72 supranational networks for AMR surveillance of bacteria, fungi, HIV, 73 
 tuberculosis and malaria, of which 34 are on-going.2,3 Their median duration was 6 74 
years (range 1 to 70 years) and the median number of LMICs included in each network 75 
was 8 (range 1 to 67). This scenario is not limited to the lowest resource settings. A 76 
review of European AMR surveillance found similar fragmentation and heterogeneity, 77 
with numerous local and national systems that lacked coordination, harmonization and 78 
information sharing with international networks.4 There was also inadequate 79 
standardization of epidemiological definitions, samples and data collected, 80 
microbiological testing methods and data sharing policies.4 81 
Categorization of the 72 LMIC networks identified in the review revealed that 82 
the minority (n=26) were led by governments or the WHO, with the remainder being 83 
associated with academia (n=24) or pharma (n=22).2,3  The number of networks that 84 
provided unrestricted access to the data was low (n=3); the remainder were closed (no 85 
access) (n=38), or categorised as ‘shared or unclear’ (n=38, shared meaning that data 86 
sharing is restricted to specific groups or consortium members). The proportion of 87 
networks identified for bacteria (excluding TB) and network provider is reproduced in 88 
Figure 1. Although this does not equate to the proportion of data generated by each 89 
network, it is notable that for bacterial pathogens the majority of networks are led by 90 
researchers and pharma, none of which have the capability to upload their data to 91 
GLASS. This represents a substantial untapped source of data from settings where the 92 
need for surveillance data is greatest, and could provide a short-term solution that 93 
bridges the gap between now and the time when routine surveillance capacity has been 94 
established.  95 
 The purpose of this Personal View is to explore how such information 96 
generated in countries with weak AMR surveillance systems could be harnessed for 97 
patient and public health, including consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of 98 
 these data, mechanisms to increase their standardization, harmonization and sharing, 99 
and the benefits that could be derived by investing in innovation.   100 
 101 
Alternative sources of AMR data generated in LMIC 102 
Pharma 103 
Pharmaceutical companies generate a large volume of high quality bacterial 104 
susceptibility data before and after new agents are marketed to fulfil regulatory 105 
requirements. These data are largely undisclosed, but some companies are now 106 
providing aggregated data, including Pfizer who have developed ATLAS 107 
(Antimicrobial Testing Leadership and Surveillance), a searchable database on 108 
resistance to Pfizer anti-infective agents.5 The SENTRY Antimicrobial Surveillance 109 
Program is a notable commercial surveillance programme run by JMI Laboratories 110 
since 1997 that collects data from more than 200 sites worldwide,6 largely from the US 111 
and Europe. Findings based on aggregated data of specific species or genera are 112 
published, but the dataset is proprietary and not available for wider use. GSK began the 113 
Survey of Antibiotic Resistance (SOAR) study in 2002. This focuses on the 114 
effectiveness of antibiotics in the treatment of community-acquired respiratory tract 115 
infections.7 This concentrates in particular on countries and regions for which little 116 
other susceptibility data is available, findings from which are regularly reported in the 117 
published literature.8,9   118 
Pharma data have several strengths. Isolates are obtained from a global 119 
distribution. Organism identification and susceptibility testing procedures are strictly 120 
standardised and quality controlled according to international standards. Isolates are 121 
transported and re-tested in a central accredited laboratory, ensuring reliability and 122 
reproducibility of results. However, there are several notable disadvantages. There are 123 
 often no meta-data (clinical presentation and outcomes or demographic information) 124 
associated with the isolates. Organism sampling fulfils the requirements of the 125 
particular pharma project rather than being representative or generalizable to the local 126 
population, and centralised testing means that quality controlled test data are not 127 
available to guide individual patient care, nor do local laboratories benefit from 128 
improved quality management as a result of participation. Locations perceived to 129 
represent small markets are typically under-represented. Furthermore, there is no 130 
information on denominator data and so the results may be biased and may not reflect 131 
the true burden of resistance in the area tested.  132 
 133 
Academia 134 
Researchers generate a wealth of data on antimicrobial resistance in numerous LMIC. 135 
The reasons for data generation include the study of infectious disease aetiology and 136 
associated antimicrobial susceptibility, therapeutic drug trials, and studies on disease 137 
pathogenesis and the molecular biology of bacteria. Some research laboratories have 138 
become embedded within district hospitals or other healthcare facilities in LMIC where 139 
they provide the only source of ongoing diagnostic microbiology, adopting a model in 140 
which research and the provision of microbiological services work in partnership. 141 
Compared with pharma data, these often provide greater depth of information for 142 
specific populations (e.g. all patients treated in a particular hospital) and many have 143 
been operating for several years or even decades.  144 
Research data has several potential strengths. Laboratories may be subject to 145 
good laboratory practice (GLP) when the information generated is performed to specific 146 
standards, supported by laboratories and methods that are rigorously evaluated through 147 
robust Quality Assurance and Quality Control programmes. The methods used to 148 
 generate bacterial susceptibility data are notoriously error prone and data generated 149 
outside of quality controlled laboratories may be of sub-optimal quality,10,11 and the 150 
inclusion of quality-assured research data in national and global databases could 151 
increase the proportion of accurate data points. Patient information may also be 152 
collected on clinical presentation, duration of hospital stay, antibiotic treatment, 153 
complications and outcome. Furthermore, understanding the trajectory for resistance 154 
often requires evaluation of susceptibility data over long time-scales, and newer 155 
national surveillance programmes may not yet have sufficient retrospective information 156 
to make the most of new data.   157 
Researcher-defined infectious disease aetiology and common susceptibility 158 
patterns, even if performed intermittently, supports empiric prescribing in settings 159 
where the treatment of febrile illness is based on clinical features and there is no funding 160 
to offer routine testing to patients. Empiric prescribing may result in over use of 161 
antibiotics and increased rates of resistance. In the longer term the ideal would be to 162 
have a global surveillance programme that promotes laboratory testing for better patient 163 
care and directed antibiotic therapy associated with antibiotic stewardship. In the short 164 
term, however, empiric prescribing is an essential approach that saves lives, provided 165 
that data are sufficiently contemporaneous. Although not always the case, research-166 
driven AMR data may not be generated with sufficient speed to provide information 167 
that guides individual patient treatment. 168 
When research laboratories are embedded in district hospitals in rural areas (as 169 
they often are), inclusion of their data in global databases could also go some way to 170 
balancing selection bias that can arise. For example, WHO GLASS requires 171 
participating countries to establish at least one surveillance site and then extend the 172 
number over time. In LMIC where diagnostic microbiology laboratories are scarce, 173 
 these are most likely to be situated in tertiary hospitals.  Bacteria isolated at tertiary 174 
hospitals in any part of the world are more likely to be associated with patients with 175 
more severe or complex disease, patients who have received numerous courses of 176 
antibiotics, patients with prolonged hospitalisation, and those transferred from other 177 
hospitals with hospital acquired infection, all of which will lead to over-representation 178 
of bacterial resistance compared with patients at district hospitals or the wider 179 
community.  180 
Research-generated data also has several potential limitations. Data may be 181 
biased, including ascertainment and sampling biases.12 For example, the study design 182 
may target patient sub-sets that do not reflect the wider population with infectious 183 
diseases, such as sampling of patients within cohorts that have better access to care, or 184 
patients with the most severe infection syndromes. Since a proportion of bloodstream 185 
infection will be hospital-acquired, studies of severe invasive disease may inflate rates 186 
of resistance and may not capture milder forms of community-associated infection in 187 
patients treated as out-patients, which may be caused by organisms with lower 188 
antimicrobial resistance. Research data may also include duplicate samples. Six main 189 
types of potential bias that may influence the validity or interpretation of surveillance 190 
data have been identified, which provides a framework for reviewing the use of research 191 
data in AMR surveillance (use of inadequate or inappropriate denominator data; case 192 
definitions; case ascertainment; sampling bias; failure to deal with multiple 193 
occurrences; and biases related to laboratory practice and procedures).13  194 
 195 
Private laboratories 196 
A source of susceptibility data that may remain unseen by national surveillance 197 
systems, particularly in many LMIC settings, is laboratories in private hospitals that 198 
 generate data for patient care.14-16 The quality of data generated by private laboratories 199 
varies considerably, but those that are accredited and perform quality assured services 200 
produce data of similar or better quality than public laboratories. In India, almost all 201 
medical laboratories accredited by the National Accreditation Board for Testing and 202 
Calibration Laboratories (NABL) are in the private sector, and in South Africa more 203 
than 80% of SANAS (South African National Accreditation System)-accredited 204 
medical laboratories are in the private sector. 15 This has led to calls to utilise these data, 205 
and the inclusion of such data by initiatives such as ResistanceMap.17 This displays 206 
antimicrobial resistance data on twelve bacterial species isolated in 49 countries, 207 
collected between 1999 to 2015 (depending on the country), together with antibiotic 208 
consumption data from 75 countries between 2000 and 2014.  The primary sources of 209 
data are public and private laboratory networks that routinely collect susceptibility 210 
results, but data from India comes exclusively from the private sector.  211 
Private laboratories can provide extensive datasets for populations for whom 212 
there is a very limited supply of reliable AMR data from alternative sources, but again 213 
can suffer from the types of bias already described for research data. Furthermore, these 214 
laboratories often serve a sub-set of more affluent people, including medical tourists 215 
and members of the expatriate community, which may not provide an accurate 216 
representation of rates of resistance for similar types of infection in the wider 217 
population.  218 
 219 
Barriers to using alternative sources of AMR data from LMIC 220 
Despite the obvious utility of placing AMR surveillance data generated by academia, 221 
pharma or private laboratories into the public domain, very little of these data generated 222 
in LMIC is utilised by organisations involved in regional or global surveillance. There 223 
 are several barriers that prevent this from happening.  Data are held in numerous silos 224 
with highly restricted access. Academics generate data that usually remains private until 225 
published in peer-review journals, when individual patient-level data may not be 226 
released and may be delayed by several years from the point of collection because of 227 
the time taken to analyse, write and publish. Pharma companies have to jump through 228 
several legal hoops before they release their data into the public domain. Even if 229 
researchers and pharma companies are keen to deposit data towards global analyses, its 230 
aggregation is hampered by a lack of harmonisation in data collection, a lack of tools 231 
that allow easy data deposition, and a framework that prevents publication of their data 232 
by unscrupulous competitors. Furthermore, GLASS collects and reports data on 233 
resistance rates aggregated at national level by Ministries of Health, and cannot 234 
currently accept information generated by research activities or pharma. In general, 235 
national programmes take ownership of surveillance activities in-country, and 236 
agreement may not be reached for direct data deposition to WHO GLASS by non-237 
governmental groups. Furthermore, AMR surveillance data can represent potentially 238 
sensitive data, particularly when these describe high rates of resistance or the 239 
emergence of a novel resistance mechanism to a key antibiotic. 240 
 241 
Mechanisms to unlock AMR data 242 
Incentivising access to data from academia and pharma 243 
‘Bottom-up’ research and pharma activity that generates AMR data is not public health 244 
surveillance in the strict sense. Furthermore, the majority of researchers and pharma-245 
employed scientists would be quick to highlight that public health surveillance is 246 
neither their responsibility nor area of interest. Agreeing on the principle that 247 
researchers and pharma companies could make a major contribution to global 248 
 surveillance should be aligned with the recognition that this is not their primary 249 
purpose, and will be associated with a financial cost. Debate is required about incentives 250 
to support the additional workload associated with sharing data to national programmes 251 
or other repositories and who should coordinate this. This could draw on experience 252 
gained on academic incentives during the development of WWARN (the WorldWide 253 
Antimalarial Resistance Network platform).18 Any investment should not detract from 254 
funding that provides improved data sources for patient care, surveillance and  255 
prevention of antimicrobial resistance.  256 
The flow of research-generated data to global initiatives could be facilitated by 257 
funders, who could develop guidelines on sharing of specific data sets, which could 258 
become an integral component of a successful funding award. This is already the case 259 
for some forms of data, examples being the submission of all sequence data generated 260 
by the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute into public databases, and funding by the 261 
Wellcome Trust linked to an open access publication policy. Such changes would 262 
require a clear plan for formatting and destination of data deposition. Journals and 263 
publishers could also develop guidelines on data deposition for publications on drug-264 
resistant infection, and could make this a necessary part of submission. Data released 265 
into public databases by researchers would need to be protected by data access 266 
committees or through other mechanisms, but this is not insurmountable since solutions 267 
are already in place for numerous types of data. There are also examples of training and 268 
data sharing/open access agreements having been developed that are contextualised and 269 
locally acceptable.19, 20 270 
The Wellcome Trust have begun to address access to untapped sources of global 271 
surveillance data held by pharma through a recently funded project conducted by the 272 
Open Data Institute. This has created a mechanism to bring together leaders from public 273 
 health and the pharmaceutical industry, who are collaborating to explore how value 274 
could be added by the re-use of available data. An evaluation of the mechanisms and 275 
barriers to making this open access has been completed and detailed in a post-project 276 
report.21 One proposal is to create a public-private partnership to improve local 277 
laboratory capacity. Another is to suggest that relevant metadata and denominator data 278 
are also collected, fulfilling the objectives of the pharma project whilst also informing 279 
local AMR prevalence, which while not informing individual patient care could inform 280 
empiric prescribing protocols.  281 
 282 
Supporting Ministries of Health to access data 283 
Ministries of Health could collaborate with research institutions where this is not the 284 
case, or a public–private partnership could be forged so that data generated by research, 285 
pharma or private laboratories efforts can be submitted to GLASS as national data. 286 
There are examples of research units in Asia and Africa that have already developed 287 
close and sustainable working relationships with the relevant Ministry of Health, who 288 
use the information provided to shape national prescribing policies. In this way, 289 
countries can be empowered to utilize data generated in their own country, with local 290 
researchers undertaking in-depth analyses using a range of sources, encouraging 291 
comparisons of incidence and prevalence rates of drug-resistant infection between 292 
different areas in the country to monitor disease burden and impact of action plans in 293 
each area. This also represents an important training opportunity for government staff, 294 
who can develop the technical capability to analyse data that is ultimately generated 295 
through country-led capacity building.    296 
 297 
The need for specialist networks 298 
 Having argued that the development of new initiatives that effectively replicate WHO 299 
GLASS and that fragment data are generally to be discouraged, there are some 300 
circumstances when additional networks add vital new information. A notable example 301 
is the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, which has recently been funded by a 302 
joint award from the Wellcome, the UK Fleming Fund and the Bill and Melinda Gates 303 
Foundation to gather, map and analyse disease and death caused by drug-resistant 304 
infections. This will be used to quantify the global burden of disease (GBD) from drug-305 
resistant infections compared with other diseases and causes of death, and so inform 306 
policy and decision-making. Estimating GBD for AMR faces numerous challenges, 307 
including difficulties in linking surveillance data with clinical or outcome data and 308 
causal attribution, and cannot be regarded as a routine surveillance activity at present.  309 
 310 
Investing in innovation 311 
Investment is needed to promote innovation in AMR surveillance. For example, 312 
harnessing emerging technologies relating to Big Data and Artificial Intelligence could 313 
lead to more effective mechanisms of AMR data capture, sharing and analysis tools. 314 
An innovative system to support automatic data harmonisation between different 315 
laboratories and institutions could achieve numerous objectives, including an inbuilt 316 
system to standardise data analysis and quality tests for data from multiple sources; 317 
capture of patient outcome data to underpin calculations of GBD; and rapid relay of 318 
information to treating clinicians e.g. via electronic decision support algorithms. Data 319 
could be automatically linked to national agencies and international data repositories. 320 
Innovation in data capture would benefit from early involvement of experts in the social 321 
sciences so that the behaviour change required to support buy-in is an integral part of 322 
planning and development. Mapping of data sources may also require consideration of 323 
 the regulatory environment in some settings. New innovation needs to be linked to 324 
effective translation, scale up and integration, and assessed in terms of impact on 325 
policy.22 Any alternative system developed will need to be either fully inter-operable 326 
with WHO GLASS, or able to generate data in a format that can be uploaded.  327 
 328 
Conclusions and next steps 329 
Our understanding of the global burden of disease from drug-resistant infection in 330 
LMICs is rudimentary, and data from academia, pharma and private laboratories could 331 
make an important and rapid contribution. A dialogue is required to determine how data 332 
generated in LMICs might flow from these bodies to national and global AMR 333 
surveillance networks, and how they might support the development of laboratory and 334 
analytical capacity, including robust quality management systems, for prospective data 335 
collection. This should build on current initiatives such as the Fleming Fund, which is 336 
providing regional grants to collect existing AMR and antimicrobial use data from all 337 
possible sources. Table 1 summarises proposed changes that could help to bring this 338 
into effect.  339 
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 FIGURE LEGENDS  404 
Figure 1. AMR surveillance networks since 2000  405 
Sunburst chart representing 44 supranational networks performing AMR surveillance 406 
in bacteria (not including TB) categorised according to their lead organisation type 407 
(Pharma, academia, WHO/governmental). Adapted from reference 1.  408 
 Table 1. Key actions to harness AMR data from alternatives sources in LMIC 409 
 410 
Objectives Actions 
Map data  • Map and evaluate quality/utility of data held and generated 
• Determine how to enhance these resources, i.e. through the 
addition of patient outcome data 
• Determine how data can contribute to the global burden of disease 
due to AMR 
Create 
mechanisms for 
data sharing and 
capacity 
building 
• Identify incentives that promote the contribution of data from 
academic, pharma and private laboratories 
• Agree the basis for data sharing, including ownership, ethical and 
legal considerations 
• Develop mechanisms for data harmonisation, collation and 
analysis 
• Promote private – public partnerships to build capacity in local 
laboratories for patient care and surveillance 
Facilitate update 
of data 
nationally and 
internationally 
• Use data to support National Action Plans 
• Seek mechanisms and create funding opportunities to support 
uptake of academia/pharma/private lab data by WHO GLASS and 
other data sharing initiatives 
Innovation in 
data capture, 
analysis and 
sharing  
Create a data collection interface that supports:  
• Case-based surveillance 
• Quality assurance and control and a universal reporting standard 
for patient data  
• Automated linkage to national agencies and international data 
repositories 
  411 
 Figure 1 412 
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